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ON VALUE MAXIMIZATION AND ALTERNATIVE OBJECTIVES
OF THE FIRM
S. J. GROSSMAN AND J. E. STIGLITZ*
THE RECENT LITERATURE on firm behavior has been characterized by two contrast-
ing strands of analysis: on the one hand, there is the literature attempting to extend
the conventional maxims of profit maximization of competitive firms from the
familiar static models to dynamic contexts and into situations of uncertainty. These
analyses argue that firms should maximize their stock market value and explore the
implications of this for firm behavior. On the other hand, there is the vast and
growing "managerial" literature, in which other objectives, such as "satisficing,"
"sales maximizing," and "maximization of the manager's utility functions" are
postulated. The second group of analyses criticize the first as being unrealistic,
while the first argues that it provides the best "first approximation" to firm
behavior: if firms did not maximize their stock market value, or deviated far from
value maximization, someone would attempt to take them over, change the course
of action of the firm, and make a pure capital gain. This paper presents a unified
framework for analyzing firm behavior which can be used to reconcile these
divergent views.
We begin our analysis by taking seriously several aspects of modern corporations
which are usually ignored: there exist shareholders' meetings, the right to vote at
these shareholders' meetings often has market value (market prices for voting and
non-voting shares often differ); disagreements occasionally arise at these meetings;
takeover bids are not uncommon; and takeovers are often disputed. The modern
corporation is an economic institution in which there is always a potential political
(i.e. voting) aspect. Thus, we model the firm as if the action it takes were
determined by a majority vote of its shareholders. In deciding what action to vote
for, shareholders must have some expectations of the consequences of alternative
actions; in particular, we consider a small firm, so that it is not unreasonable for
the individual to assume that the actions and values of all other firms will be
unaffected. Thus we take the conventional Nash-non-cooperative view of market
equilibrium. On the other hand, the action of the firm may have an effect on the
market value of the firm in question, and it may lead individuals to decide to
reallocate their portfolios.' We postpone until later a more detailed discussion of
what a market equilibrium would look like in this context; but the simplest case to
analyze is that where all individuals agree on what action the firm ought to take. In
some sense, when that is the case, the shareholders' meeting is redundant.
Section 1 of this paper gives an introduction to our result that in many cases
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where a stock is traded, it seems clear that there will not be stockholder unanimity.
Section 2 sets up a formal model. Sections 3 and 4 critically survey the results on
unanimity in the context of a multiperiod model. Section 5 shows how unanimity
theory can be used to prove and analyze the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Sections 6
and 7 discuss the value of value maximization, and some paradoxes involved in
take-over bids.
1. INTRODUCTION TO SHAREHOLDER UNANIMITY ,
In the conventional static models the desirability of profit maximization is obvious;
there are prices for all goods and factors. The firm's "value" is simply the value of
output minus the value of inputs. All prices are known and the technology is
known, so there is unanimity about what course of action leads to value maximiza-
tion. Value maximization is desired by every individual because an increase in the
market value of the firm simply moves the individual's budget constraint outward
(in parallel, since prices are assumed to remain unchanged).
This result extends in a straightforward—and uninteresting—way to dynamic
situations with uncertainty when there is a complete set of future and contingent
claim (Arrow-Debreu) securities markets. Much of the recent literature on
corporate firm behavior can be thought of as an attempt to extend these results on
unanimity to situations where there is not a complete set of markets. It has been
shown that unanimity obtains if there is no trade and if any production plan of the
firm can be written as a linear combination of production plans of other firms; i.e.
there is what has come to be called spanning.
The major argument of the paper is: (i) in any interesting market there will be
trade, and then spanning does not imply unanimity; in particular, we examine two
situations where trade is likely to be continuously generated; in one, trade is
generated by the arrival of new information; it is obvious that differential informa-
tion may give rise to trade, but even if the new information is obtained by
everyone, if individual tastes (attitudes towards risk) differ, the equilibrium port-
folios will change in response to the new information. In the other, trade is
generated by life cycle considerations: every period, there are individuals who
retire and who sell their shares to new individuals who hold the shares as savings
for retirement; (ii) if the financial decisions of the firms are also taken into
account, spanning requires essentially a full set of markets and thus does not
constitute any weakening of the classical result, and (iii) if in addition to spanning
firms are assumed to behave as perfect competitors in the composite commodities
which form a basis for the spanned space, then there is unanimity. We call this
assumption "competitivity." However, the assumption of both spanning and com-
petitivity lead to the very strong result that firms desire to maximize the net market
value of their shares. Though this may sound like a satisfactory theory it is
empirically false and leaves unexplained the numerous phenomena referred to in
the introduction. In the concluding remarks we refer to empirical evidence for a
particular class of firms where there is unambigous evidence against the hypothesis
of value maximization.
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2. A SIMPLE MODEL: THE MULTIPERIOD MODEL WITHOUT DEBT
The economy extends for three periods: 0, 1 and 2. The state of the world, w is
composed of a signal t, which is known in period 1 and a final state i which is
known in period 2; u = {t,s). There is a single commodity which is available in each
period and which is used for consumption and investment in period 0, and for
consumption only in both periods 1 and 2.
In period 0 there are markets for the single current commodity and also for
shares in firms. It is assumed that no contingent commodity contracts can be made.
In period 1 there are markets for the single current commodity and also for shares
in the firms. Consumers also get the signal / which changes their beliefs about .r
before trading in period 1. In period 2 consumers are allocated output according to
the shares held in firms at the end of period 1.
Let there be / consumers, J firms,. T signals and S final states, indexed by
i = \,...,I,j= \,...,J, t= l , . . . , r , s= \,...,S, respectively. Sometimes /, / , T and S
will be referred to as the set of consumers, firms, signals and final states.
Consumers
We will represent consumer i's consumption plan by a vector Xi = {x°,xl,xf)
g^|+7-+7-s^ where x°ER^ is consumption in period 0 and x^ER^ is consump-
tion when there is signal t in period 1, and xf{u) = xf{t,s)GR^ is consumption in
period 2 when {t,s) was realized. Consumer /' is assumed to have a utility function
Ul defined on ^|'^^+^'^. We will assume that (/, is strictly quasi concave and
continuously differentiable on the interior of its domain, and 9( / , /3x '^oo as x'^0
f o r / = 0 , 1 .
Firms
Firmy's production possibilities are represented by a production set Y cR^'^'K
If y:e YJ we writeyj = {yj,yf) whereyfeR^ is the input in period 0 and yf{s)eR^
is the output in period 2, state s. Note that inputs appear as non-negative numbers.
We will assume that Y, is convex, closed and contains the origin. Further if y e Y
and 7° = 0, then 7 / = 0.
It is assumed that consumer / has initial endowments x°G/? + ,3c/G/?+ of the
commodity in periods 0 and 1 respectively. He also has initial shareholdings O^j > 0
in firm y where 2 / % = J for each y. For notatjonal simplicity we ignore endow-
ments in period 2. Let A'°=2,Jc°, and assume X°>Q.
Equilibrium for Fixed Production Plans
Let 7^  be given for each y'= l, . . . ,y. The /th consumer maximizes Uj{xf,xl,xf)
with respect to {9jj,e,j{t),Xi), j=\,...,J, t = l,...,T subject to: the individual's
second period budget constraint,
the individual's first period budget constraint,
^,' (0 + S PjiOOijit) < 2 Pj{t)9ij+x! (t) (2)
J j
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(consumption plus the value of shareholdings at the end of the period (after trade)
must be less than or equal to the value of shareholdings at the beginning of the
period (before trade) plus the endowment); and the individual's 0th period budget
constraint;
J j
where x}{s,t) is the (5,0th component of xf\ 9ij{t) is the desired holdings of firmy,
in period 1 if Ms the information signal; x/(0 is the tth component of xj. pj{t) is
the price of firmy' in period 1, signal t. pj is the price of firmy' in period 0. ,^y are the
desired holdings of firm j in period 0. In (3) we have assumed that inputs, yJ, are
financed by the issuance of equity alone.
With no constraint against short sales (i.e. we don't require 9ij or 9ij{t) to be
non-negative) necessary and sufficient conditions for solution to the maximum
problem are that there exist multipliers (A°,A,') such that XfGR^ and XjeRl such
that
^^U. = Xf^ V,[/,. = A/ (4)
^2i^ryJ^KPj{^)' j=\,...,J, t=\,...,T, (6)
where VQf/, = 9[/,(x,)/8A:°, and V2,t/, = [9(/,(^,)/9x/(/,5)]^=i, and A,, is the tth
component of A,'.
Equation (4) provides the interpretation of the Lagrange multipliers \° and A/ as
the marginal utility of consumption between the 0th and 1st periods. The interpre-
tation of (5) is perhaps clearer if we rewrite it as: />; = 2 / ( ^ 2 / ^ / / ^ ^i)'yj' ^^^ price
at date 0 equals the weighted average of the returns at date 2, with weights equal to
the marginal rate of substitution between goods at date 0 and date 1—signal t.
Equation (6) has the interpretation that the price (value) of a share in state t is
equal to the marginal utility generated by buying an extra share of the firm,
normalized by the marginal utility of income in state t.
A competitive exchange equilibrium for the economy, relative to the production
plans {yj) is then a collection (x,), {9ij), {9y{t)), {pj) and {pj{t)) such that (4)-(6)
hold for each consumer and the commodity market at time 0 and 1 and the share
markets at time 0 and 1 all clear:
2 •^ /°+ 2 yj'-^^' 2 9ij= 1, 2 9ij{t)= 1, (7)
' j • •
and yx!(t)=yxj(t
In the above economy, firms fix their inputs in period 0 and output is realized in
period 2. In period 1 consumers get new information about the distribution of firm
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output in period 2, so they have the opportunity to recontract away from their
period zero holdings of firm shares. In period 2, state s, each consumer gets the
output that corresponds to his share of the firms he owns.
In the above definition of equilibrium we took as exogenously given the produc-
tion plans of all firms. We now exposit some methods of determining production
plans as well as exchange equilibrium. It is useful to parameterize the firm's choice
of production plan; we letyj{pj)=yj, and assume a small change in pj corresponds
to a small change in y,.^
The crucial part of an analysis involves examining how the stockholders of firmy'
feel about a small change from pj to Pj + dpj. To see this we totally differentiate a
consumer's utility function with respect to p . That is, we define
^^^_^^ t / , (x , ) subject to (l)-(3).
By direct calculation
dyf dyf
In deriving equation (8) we have used equations (4)-(6) and the assumption:
dpJt) dvi, dp^
- 5 ^ = :7^ = -P=0 for k=^J,\fteT. (9)
dp dp dp ^ ^ '
That is, when theyth firm changes its production decision no change is assumed to
occur in all other firms' production decisions and prices. (Here we are already
making assumptions about the degree of competition among firms or, implicitly
imposing a Nash equilibrium notion on firm behavior.) If (8) has the same sign for
all individuals, there is unanimity with respect to different individual evaluations of
alternative production plans. The question is when will (8) have the same sign for
all individuals. It is our objective to show that the assumption of "spanning," which
is made to get unanimity in a two period context, is not sufficient in a three period
context. We will show that in addition to spanning the stronger assumption of
competitivity (to be defined below) is a sufficient condition for unanimity in a two
period context (i.e. one trading period).
3. UNANIMITY WITH ONLY ONE TRADING PERIOD
Suppose we close the market for shares in period 1, or that with the market open all
traders decide not to trade. In this case the firm makes its decision in period 0 and
in period 2 consumers get their period 0 shares of the firm's period 2 output. That
2. We will assume that mapping yj can be found such that the exchange equilibrium prices are
differentiable functions of pj.
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is 9ij^ = 9j^{t) for all t, so equation (8) can be written as
rf(/; \ , . , dpj _ dyf
(10)
The first term on the right hand side of (10) represents a wealth (i.e. a capital
gains) effect, while the second term represents a consumption effect (i.e. the change
in utility due to a change in the composition of date 2 consumption).
The first term makes clear that capital gains are only important to the extent that
the individual is a seller of the security, i.e. his initial endowment ^^  exceeds his
planned holdings of shares at the end of the period. (The term 9jj{dy°/ dpj) comes
from the particular specification of how in effect an additional investment is
financed; i.e. from compulsory payments from the original shareholders.)
The distinction between the consumption and capital gains effects is very clear in
a different context: suppose there were a single producer of automobiles, and
because of technological considerations, all automobiles had to be either blue or
pink. Suppose, too, that more people preferred blue cars, so that the value of the
firm would be maximized by producing blue cars. But if a shareholder also
consumes cars, and knows that the production decision of the firm is going to
affect his "consumption set"—i.e. if the firm produces blue cars, he cannot
purchase a pink car, then a shareholder with a strong preference for pink cars, may
vote for producing pink cars, even when there is considerable loss in market value
as a result. In the context of the stock market, the point is that whenever there is
not a full set of contingent claims markets, there is always the possibility that the
slope of the budget constraint is altered, not in the dramatic way of the previous
example (where the implicit relative price of the two kinds of cars, pink and blue, is
altered from infinity to zero) but still altered in an important way.
Thus, the search for conditions for unanimity breaks down into looking for
conditions under which (a) there is unanimity about the sign of the consumption
effect, (b) there is unanimity about the sign of the wealth effect, and (c) there is
unanimity about the relative importance of the two.
Assume that there was a complete set of securities; then 2/'^2/^/~\°9(-^) where
q{s) is the market price for income in state s. Using (10) and (4)--(6) we obtain
Note that now the consumption effect is the same for all individuals. Moreover, in
that situation
The change in the market value is simply the value—at market prices—of the
change in inputs and outputs. The fly term then cancels, and we obtain dU^/dpj
= \%j[{dpj/dpj)-{dy°/dpj)], the change in the net market value. This is the
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standard result. Note, however, that there were two distinct stages in the analysis.
The first involved obtaining agreement on the consumption effect, the second
involved relating the magnitude of the consumption effect to the capital gain effect.
Thus, if there were taxes, leading to a discrepancy between consumer and producer
prices, i.e. so that equation (12) did not obtain, then unanimity about the consump-
tion effect would not imply overall unanimity.
It is obviously not necessary to have a complete set of securities to obtain
unanimity on the consumption effect. Stiglitz [1970] noted two conditions under
which unanimity on the consumption effect obtained: (a) if there is multiplicative
uncertainty, so that (with suitable parameterization) dyj/dpj=yj, we obtain
directly from (4) and (6) the result that 9ij^,V^,Ui{dyj/dpj) = 9i^^2t^,-yj = \f9ijPj
so the sign of the consumption effect is independent of /, for all shareholders of
firm J, and (b) in the mean variance model (either a quadratic utility function or
jointly normally distributed random variables), he also showed that the sign of the
consumption effect is independent of /'.
Ekern-Wilson [1974] and Leland [1974] have generalized the technological condi-
tions under which stockholders are unanimous with respect to the sign of the
consumption effect. Ekern-Wilson assume that any feasible change in a firm's
output plan can be written as a linear combination of all firms' current output
plans; with {/?}j^, given, they assume that there exist real numbers a^ ^ such that
dyj J
^ = 2 o^ikyl (13)
If (13) holds for {/,}y=i we say there is spanning at [yjYj^y Substituting to
evaluate the consumption effect in (10), using (5) and (6) yields
dyj
«//2 V2,f/,^ = ^y2 V2,V,^aj0,l = \fe,j^aj,p,, (14)
the sign of which is independent of / for all shareholders of firmy. Informally, if
any output of the firm is a linear combination of the outputs of other firms then all
traders must agree on the consumption effect of an output change, because
consumption opportunities are unchanged.
Consumption unanimity, as we have emphasized, does not imply overall unanim-
ity for there must be unanimity about the relative importance of the consumption
effect and the capital gains effect. It turns out that to obtain the latter, only three
general sets of conditions have been derived: (a) there is no capital gains effect, (b)
there is no consumption effect, and (c) in addition to spanning we make the
assumption (to be given formally below) of competitivity.
To see conditions under which (a) or (b) obtain Stiglitz [1970] suggested that it is
useful to isolate two phases in a corporation's life cycle; in the early phase, a small
group of investors own the firm and want to raise capital to expand, and each
member wants to diversify his personal wealth into other securities. In this early
phase, the initial stockholders have very large Sjj (initial holdings) relative to 9jj
(desired holdings). Thus, assuming that fl,y?wO we can write (10) as dU^/d
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^Xf9jj[{dpj/dpj)-{dyJ'/dpj)], i.e. the consumption effect is negligible; clearly in this
case, all stockholders desire the firm to maximize net market value.
In the mature steady state stage of a firm's existence, stockholders simply hold
their portfolio shares every period, e.g. in a world with no new information or other
shocks hitting the market, a steady state-* means that 9jj = ^y, so the capital gains
effect drops out, and we obtain only the consumption effect (where, obviously, if
there is additional investment in the 0th period, we must take the cost of that into
account). Ekern-Wilson [1974], Leland [1973], and Radner [1974] have used the
assumption that ^^  = 9jj along with spanning to prove unanimity, and referred to
this situation as ex post unanimity, to distinguish it from the case when the
contraint is not imposed, which is called ex ante unanimity.
To see more precisely the nature Of what is going on, it may be useful to consider
a special case. Assume a mean variance model and a risk free asset with period 2
return defined as R; consider a firm whose returns are independently distributed
from all other firms, and consider a change in its production plans which increases
the output in all states of nature proportionately: dnj/dpj = Hj, doj/dpj^Oj where [ij
and Oj are the mean and standard deviations of theyth firm's returns.
Assume that all traders have constant absolute risk aversion. Then the basic
market valuation equation implies that there is a positive constant k such that
Pj = {p.j — kaj)/R. From the first order conditions for optimality there is a positive
multiplier Af such that
(15)
The second term in brackets is the consumption effect, about which, all sharehold-
ers are unanimous. However, we now show that shareholders need not be un-
animous regarding the production plan because of the capital gains term. Since k is
a constant relating to the risk aversions of the shareholders,
dp, kaf
Using (15) and (16) together yields dU*/dpj = \f{R9,j[{dpj/dpj)-{dyf/dpj)] +
9jjkaJ). Thus, all shareholders desire to expand the firm beyond its net value
maximizing scale, since net value maximization occurs at the p such that dp,/dp,
= dyf/dp..
Note that we have used the capital asset pricing model to calculate how
shareholders think a change in the risk-return of a firm will affect the price of a
firm. From (16) it can be seen that shareholders do not feel that doubling the
output of their firm in each state of nature doubles the value of the firm. If output
in each state of nature was a separate good then "perfect competition" would mean
that doubhng output in each state of nature doubles the value of the firm. If in (16)
3. Stiglitz was careful, however, to point out that this assumption of no trade was not a reasonable one
to impose except for gaining analytical insights into the problem.
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we had assumed this, then dpj/dpj=pj then there would be unanimity in favor of
net-value maximization, as can be seen from (15).
Thus, we see that when there is trade, i.e. O^j ^ 9^, there need not be unanimity.
Leland ([1973], p. 16) and Radner [1974] have shown that if we assume
"competitivity" then there will be unanimity. Competitivity means that each
consumer believes that if the output of any firm increases by b% in each and every
state of nature, then the value of the firm increases by 6%. This assumption leads to
implicit prices by which all consumers can unanimously agree about the value of a
change in production plan. From (10)-(15); competitivity implies unanimity with
respect to net-value maximization.
4. THE MULTIPERIOD ECONOMY
In the last section we assumed that there was only one trading period in order to
survey the literature on unanimity. In this section we return to the model of section
2 where consumers are permitted to trade in period 1. In equation (8) of section 2,
we see that consumer /'s preference for a change in the yth firm's production
decisions dp,, depends upon three terms. The first term is the period 0 wealth effect,
the second term is the period 1 wealth effect, and the third term is the consumption
effect (the fourth term is the wealth effect due to the cost of the new inputs). We
can use the spanning assumption, (13), along with the first order conditions (5) and
(6) to write (8) as
dU* dp, T dp,(t)
+ 2 \,«s(0 2 Vftw (1')
where we have used the implicit competitivity assumption that dp,^/dpj = O =
dPk{O/dpj for k i= J. Note that a,^  does not depend upon the signal t because none
of the firms' output vectors depends upon /. In this model firms must fix their
production plans in period 0, no firm produces any output until period 2. Consu-
mers may trade in period 1 based upon new information. From (17) it is clear that
there will be unanimity if 9ij = 9jj = 9i,{t). However even if the Ekern-Wilson-Leland
assumption is made that ^^ = ^,. there will not, in general, be unanimity when
9,i'9,j{t).
There is one situation in which there will be unanimity and that is when
competitivity is assumed. That is, we can construct the Arrow-Debreu economy for
characteristics as of period 1. If we can write the value of the firm in period 1 at
signal / as a melange of characteristics (i.e. an appropriate mixture of securities),
for each of which there is a competitive market, then the value of the firm in each
signal-state can be computed as in an Arrow-Debreu economy. Grossman-Stiglitz
[1976a] show that with the appropriate competitivity assumption, it will always be
possible to do the above and there will be unanimity with regard to value
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maximization. Thus, we showed that when the economy is an extension of an
Arrow-Debreu economy there will always be unanimity, even if there is trade.
As we argued in section 3, the no trade assumption was crucial to any unanimity
theorem which was not a simple extension of an Arrow-Debreu securities market.
We argued in this section that new information would give rise to trade; here we
argue that the life cycle of the individual will give rise to trade. (Our earlier
discussion concerning the stages of the firm provided a third reason for trade to
occur continuously in a stock market: firms also have a life cycle.) When in-
dividuals are young, they buy shares as a form of saving; when they are old they
sell them, presumably to the next generation.
Assume individuals live for two periods. They work the first period, buy shares;
in the second period they receive dividends—based on the firm's action in the
previous period—make decisions which will determine the dividend the period
after, sell their shares, and finally come the proceeds. In that context, it is clear that
at the time of the decision, for the decision makers 9^ = 0. Hence all firms will
maximize their stock market value. Note, however, that if we modify the model to
make it a three period model, then there will exist shareholders in the first and
third years of their lives. For the former tf^ > 0 while for the latter, as before ^^  = 0.
Hence we cannot be assured that there will be unanimity unless the spanning and
competivity assumptions are satisfied. Spanning alone is enough only if there is no
trade.
5. SPANNING AND THE CHOICE OF A DEBT-EQUITY RATIO
We now return to the one trading period model of section 3. We suppose that the
production plan y, = {y^yj) has been chosen, and the firm must now decide how to
finance v°. Let D, be the period 0 value of the debt issued by firm J. Let 1 — a be
the fraction of the firm that the initial shareholders sell to raise capital (i.e. new
equity). Then yf=Dj + {\ - a)pj. Let Bj be the principal plus the interest which the
firm promises that bondholders will receive in period 2. Let by be the fraction of
firm/s debt held by consumer /. Then (1) is replaced by xf{s) = '2,j9ijma.x{0,yj{s)-
Bj) + '^jbymm{Bj,yj{s)). Thus, the consumer's period 2 consumption comes from
non-defaulted debt payments and claims to residual output. Similarly (3) is re-
placed by xf+j2jPj9ij + ^jD.by<'2j9ij{pj-yj'+D,)+_xf. Thus each initial share-
holder owns a9ij percent of the firm which is worth a9jjPj = 9ij{pj-yj+Dj).
We assume no trade in period 1, so the consumer maximizes Uj{xf,xj,xf) subject
to the above constraints, with respect to xf, 9^, and b^,. Denote the maximized utility
by U*{Bp. Let B{Bj)^{s\yj{s)<Bj] and NB{Bj) = {s\yf{s)>Bj). We are in-
terested in a change in the debt-equity ratio keeping the production plan /






here Vj = Dj +pj, and V, t/, = Sr^.9U,{x)/dxf{t,s).
The Modigliani-Miller theorem gives conditions under which a change in the
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debt-equity ratio leaves the value of the firm unchanged. However, the appropriate
theorem should be that all shareholders are indifferent about the debt-equity ratio.
As can be seen from (18) dVj/dBj = O is not equivalent to dUf /dBj = O. There is
one important and well known situation where the two are equivalent, that is when
9jj = bjj. This occurs if there is portfolio separation such that all consumers desire to
hold the same mutual fund of all risky assets (e.g. when all consumers homo-
geneously believe that returns on all securities are multivariate normal), i.e. hold all
risky assets in the same proportion.
We feel that the point of the Modigliani-Miller theorem is that the debt-equity
ratio is indeterminate because all shareholders are unanimously indifferent between
choices of Bj. For this to be true, it is necessary that dU*/dBj = Q, where it is well
defined. As can be seen from (18), this will not be true in general. One situation in
which it is true is when there is no trade, i.e. 9jj = 9ij, and strong portfolio
separation, i.e. 9jj = bjj. But this will not generalize to a multiperiod model just as ex
post unanimity does not generalize.
It might be thought that a spanning argument will lead to unanimity in the above
context. It does lead to unanimity but it also implies, under weak regularity
conditions, that there exist complete markets. See Grossman-Stiglitz [1976a] for a
proof of this fact.
6. ON THE VALUE OF VALUE MAXIMIZATION
We have attempted to show that most of the unanimity theorems in the literature
on spanning make the assumption that there is no trade during the time between
the realization of firms' output and the putting of inputs in place. That is, simple
spanning theorems concern firms that are not traded on the large stock exchanges
of most countries. Stocks traded on these exchanges have a large trading volume
every day because consumers get new information about the probability distribu-
tion of firm output (i.e. dividends). We have shown that in such an economy
consumers will in general disagree about the production plan which their firm
should use. This disagreement arises because different stockholders anticipate
different capital gains and losses as new information reaches the market concerning
firm output.
A unanimity theorem could be proved in a multiperiod context if the assumption
of competitivity is made in addition to the assumption of spanning. Though this
may seem like a minor additional assumption, it leads to a very strong implication
which spanning above does not imply. That is, if there is spanning and competitiv-
ity, then stockholders unanimously desire the firm to maximize net market value.
It is the implication of value maximization that leads us to think that the theory
is seriously incomplete. There is one class of firms where it is quite easily seen that
net-value is not maximized. A closed end mutual fund is a firm which purchases
shares of other firms on the stock market. Its only productive decision on a given
day is to purchase or sell shares of one firm for cash or shares of other firms. The
closed end mutual fund is itself a corporation with shares traded on the stock
market. It is a fact that almost all closed end mutual funds sell at a substantial
discount (see Sharpe-Sossin [1975]). That is the market value of the mutual funds
portfolio is substantially higher than the market value of the mutual fund own
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shares. This means that there is a productive decision available to the manager of
the firm which would increase its value. The manager can sell off the portfolio of
stocks for cash and then distribute the cash to the mutual fund shareholders. As
this is not done we conclude that the shareholders of the mutual fund do not desire
the fund to maximize market value.
Most discussions of unanimity involve the choice of production decisions. We
argued that the Modigliani-Miller theorem is the result that with no bankruptcy all
shareholders are unanimously indifferent among choice of the debt-equity ratio.
We showed that if there is a chance of bankrupty, then shareholders need not be
unanimously indifferent as to the debt-equity ratio. Since the bonds of the same
maturity for different firms have different yields, there must be some chance that
firms go bankrupt in the real world. It might be thought that the Modigliani-Miller
theorem would still hold if there is spanning for bonds. However, spanning for
bonds implies that there are a complete set of markets. This, of course, implies that
the debt-equity ratio is indeterminate but it has the empirically false implication
that firms maximize value and all risks are insurable.
7. EQUILIBRIUM IN THE CORPORATE ECONOMY
What happens when there is no unanimity, as our analysis suggests will generally
be the case? And, what happens if there is unanimity but not on the value
maximizing strategy, as could be the case when the spanning assumption was
satisfied, but not the competitivity assumption? Wouldn't some individual take
over the firm, change its policy to the market value maximizing policy, and make a
pure capital gain? An answer to these questions and the formulation of a complete
equilibrium theory of the market require the specification of assumptions concern-
ing the information available to the shareholder concerning the take-over and the
expectations of individuals about the actions to be taken by the firm after the
take-over. We argue that there are serious problems in formulating an equilibrium
theory of take-overs. (See Grossman-Hart [1976] for a theory of the firm without
spanning.)
Assume there is ex ante unanimity on a policy other than value maximization;
assume that the individual taking over the firm announces the firm will pursue a
value maximizing strategy; individuals know that after the take-over, the individual
is going to sell his shares to obtain his capital gain, and that in the new
shareholders' meeting following that, all will vote for the original utility maximizing
strategy. Thus, in spite of the announcement, individuals do not expect that the
firm will pursue a value maximizing strategy, and hence the entrepreneur will not
be able to reap any capital gain. In the above example, if the take-over en-
trepreneur could (because of fixed investments, say) commit the firm to the value
maximizing strategy for one period, then, he could obtain a majority of shares at
the current market price. But unless the competitivity assumption is satisfied, there
is likely to be a downward sloping demand curve for shares of firms. The market
value represents the value to the marginal purchaser; to purchase a majority of
shares, even acting as a discriminating monopsonist, would be more costly than the
current value of the firm.
There are several other problems with arranging a successful take-over even if all
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shareholders desire value maximization, but the current management is against it.
(a) If the individual taking over announces it prior to his take-over, then it does not
pay anybody to sell his shares; if he expects the take-over to be successful, by
postponing selling, the individual would make a capital gain. An exception is where
the group taking over offers all shareholders exactly the maximized market value,
but in this case there are no profits to be made from the take-over, (b) Another
quandry arises if the take-over is not announced but proceeds gradually, then only
when the individual owns, say 10% of the shares, is the take-over bid implicitly
disclosed (as current law requires). If a successful take-over bid is associated with
an increase in market value, then the market realizing this will immediately bid up
the shares upon disclosure. But then, it would pay any entrepreneur to buy 10% of
the shares, simply to obtain a capital gain. But then, of course, disclosure will not
be a signal of a take-over bid. Take-overs have many of the informational
characteristics of arbitrage discussed in Grossman-Stiglitz [1976a].
We are now prepared to suggest a definition of equilibrium: consider all the
policies with the characteristic that a majority of the shareholders who purchase the
shares'* when that policy is announced, vote for the given policy against any other
policy. For each such policy, there is a market value. An equilibrium requires that
it be preferred by a majority and be immune from take-over. The policy with the
highest market value is the equilibrium. Clearly no other policy can be an
equilibrium; for ignoring the quandaries concerning the purchase of the shares, a
take-over bid which announced the given policy would be able to sustain the given
policy and hence a capital gain could be made. If individuals assume that only
policies to be eventually pursued by the firm—and hence the policies which are
relevant—are those which can be sustained in the above sense, the market price
associated with any other policy must be lower than that market price, and hence
there will be no take-over attempts against it.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has argued that (a) spanning does not imply shareholder unanimity for
corporations that are traded, (b) If there is unanimity for a traded firm due to the
assumption of competitivity, then firms must maximize value, (c) But closed end
funds do not maximize value, and these companies are the ones we would most
expect to do so. We thus find spanning an unsatisfactory assumption, (d) We
further argue that there are fundamental difficulties with justifying value maximiza-
tion on the basis of take-over bids when firms are undervalued.
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